The core argument in this book is as follows. Policing is the aspect of social control that is directed at identifying and rectifying conflict and achieved through surveillance and the use of legitimate violence to impose sanctions. At the heart of the policing task, therefore, are two fundamental paradoxes. First, the police must use the state's monopoly of coercive violence -a morally dubious means -to preserve peace, order and tranquillity. The resolution of the perpetual scandal caused by the deployment of the 'diabolical power' of the police is resolved by the claim that the police represent the democratic will of the people and the rule of law. The second paradox is that 'not all that is policing lies with the police'. Although the police stand as romantic symbols of crime control, the sources of order and community safety lie, to a large extent, beyond the ambit of the police in the political economy and culture of society (Reiner 2016). The politics of the police in a just society should therefore be geared towards enhancing informal social control and minimizing the need to resort to police intervention so that -when they do respond to occurrences of crime and disorder -their intervention is fair, effective and legitimate. This assertion gives rise to a wide range of questions that are covered in this book, such as the meaning of fairness, effectiveness and legitimacy; how best to ensure that police power can be held accountable to the people that it purports to serve; and about the nature of the political processes that govern policing. In this chapter, we look beyond debates about the exercise of police power in localities to explore the globalisation of policing and its implications for the politics of the police in Britain.
In 1985, when The Politics of the Police was first published, its subject was conceived almost exclusively in domestic terms. The sources of crime, insecurity and disorder were understood to be local and the occasional discussion of 'travelling criminals' went no further than concerns about villains from major cities making forays into shire towns. Consequently, most discussions of policing in previous editions of this book were, explicitly or implicitly, concerned with local policework with a limited debate about the arguments for and against a national police force. Thirty-five years later, much has changed, and the policing agenda is now more evidently transnational. From disrupting organized crime and terrorism, managing mega-events, responding to transnational disasters and searching for people missing overseas, varieties of police work mirror the transnational possibilities of everyday life. The political responses to the globalisation of social ordering have had a profound impact on the architecture and métier of policing, its organisational culture, priorities and processes (Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012; . This chapter explores the development of policing agencies that operate in regional and global arenas beyond the nation state, the role of foreign police agencies acting abroad, the emergence of the overseas liaison officer as a distinct policing specialism and the impact of these developments on debates about national and local police capacity, accountability and control.
THE SHIFTING CONTEXT
The simplistic functional explanation for the growth of transnational policing is that criminality is no longer constrained by national boundaries, and therefore global cops are required to catch global robbers (Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012) . The list of the specific crime types held to exemplify this trend is very long and includes smuggling drugs, guns and tobacco; trafficking illicit products such as toxic waste, stolen artworks, antiquities and endangered species; organized immigration crime, including people trafficking and what is now known as 'modern day slavery'; financial crimes such as fraud and money laundering; international terrorism, cybercrime, and online child exploitation and abuse. Given the global reach of criminality, the argument goes, the long arm of the law should stretch well beyond local police force boundaries (Brown 2008 ).
There is a kernel of truth in this argument. The 21 st century world is more interconnected than any previous era, and this is evident in economic, political and social spheres (Held and McGrew 2003; Stalder, 2006) . Intercontinental travel, for example, has increased exponentially. Between 1970 and 2016 air passenger transport increased twelve-fold from 310 million to 3.7 billion passengers, while freight carried by sea increased four-fold from 2.6bn tonnes to 10.3bn tonnes (ICAO 2017; UNCTAD 2017) . The mobility of people and goods has implications for activities such as smuggling illicit goods, like drugs, fake pharmaceuticals, weapons, endangered wildlife and toxic waste. Cybercrime, which is borderless, implicitly requires transnational collaboration, and has become a major preoccupation for the police (Wall 2007 (Wall , 2011 . Moreover, as world trade has become more extensive and society more 'wired', the economic philosophy of neoliberalism has instilled more laissez faire forms of governance, and this has changed the opportunity structures for crime.
The revolution in information and communication technologies has also had a profound impact on the nature of criminal activities. This includes the banal point that the exponential growth of mobile telephone and computer networks enables a greater degree of communication and collaboration among groups involved in conventional organised criminal activity. It also extends to the emergence of entirely new forms of criminal behaviour. The fact that much of the business of banking and finance is now done via electronic devices means that the new crimes of hacking, spamming and phishing account for a growing proportion of all criminal activity. These points are undeniable, but do not make the argument that the recent expansion of global policing is simply a functional response to transnational organised crime any more persuasive (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) . For a start, transnational policing is nothing new (see Chapter 3). The arguments for international policing, which led to the creation of Interpol and a United Nations police capacity were first articulated in the 19th century (Deflem 2002) . Moreover, European colonialism established strong links among police forces in far distant parts of the world (Brogden 1987 , Anderson and Kilingray 1991 Sinclair, 2011; O'Reilly 2018) providing a template for contemporary transnational policing (Bowling, 2010: 69-74; Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012: 20-22 ).
In our view, transnational policing is better understood to be the result of changes in patterns of governance. Policing has developed in a number of stages. At the beginning of the modern period, policing was a matter of parochial governance, through the offices of the town or village constable and justice of the peace, and its focus was on local crime and disorder. This shifted in the 19th century as the police, along with other branches of government, became more important to the internal social order of the modern state competing in the international state system. After World War II the transnationalisation of policing intensified in step with the globalisation of politics, economy and society. From this perspective, the development of global policing can be seen as a synecdoche of global governance; it is part of the emerging practices of the transnational state system and one of its defining features (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012; Sheptycki 2000) .
Our argument is not that the nation state has become irrelevant to the politics of the police. Far from it -police forces, with their varied uniforms, insignia and traditions -are still potent symbols of nationhood. Rather, we contend that contemporary policing must be understood in the light of the development of the transnational state system that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. This system of global governance is highly complex and constitutes regional and worldwide layers and networks that did not exist before World War II. Seen from an international relations perspective, the system consists of disaggregated states that are no longer seen as unitary 'billiard balls' but as governmental networks that link horizontally across borders (Slaughter 2006).
International organizations also play an important role in global governance, including the United Nations and its agencies, including the 1988 UN Office of Drugs and Crime and United Nations Police, financial regulatory bodies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation and the World Customs Organisation. Regional organisations such as the European Union are also important to understand supranational governance and, as we discuss later in this chapter, play a specific role in pan-continental policing. Non-state actors also play a pivotal role in global governance, including domestic and international nongovernmental organisations as well as multi-national corporations and financial institutions which are arguably more important than many, if not all governments, in their control of the movement of vast quantities of capital.
Understanding globalization draws attention to the sense that many of the problems facing police organisations operating at any level stem from the consequences of the shifting flows of capital, employment opportunities and people. Although debates about transnational policing equate the police role with crime control, there are a range transnational order maintenance and service functions. This is most obvious case in relation to contributing to public order in post-conflict and disaster situations in weak and failing states, which has involved overseas policing since the 1960s (Greener 2012) . During a major natural disaster, for example, police will be involved in maintaining order, evacuation, providing first aid, distributing water and food and helping with disaster victim identification. The fact of extensive international travel and tourism, places obligations on the international community to ensure that global crises will often involve transnational cooperation. The 2004 Asian tsunami was the largest international police operation in history, with around 700 police officers and staff from 30 countries and supported by Interpol. During a two-year period, police identified more than 3,000 victims, assisted with body recovery and repatriation, and investigated victims' last known movements. The police role in dealing with sudden death, which is commonplace in the domestic realm, is also an element of the role of international liaison officers who take responsibility for citizens of their countries who die overseas. Other transnational non-crime roles include the search for missing people, coordinated order maintenance during major sporting and cultural events, and managing international public protest.
Situating policing in the development of broader political economy, there is evidence that globalisation has exacerbated inequality and fuelled insecurity among the least powerful people in the world who are losing jobs, suffering income stagnation, experiencing shrinking welfare and living more precarious lives. There is no denying that the widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnections has accelerated in the late modern age, and that this has implications for transnational policing.
Critics of the globalisation thesis note, however, that human beings have communicated transnationally for centuries, at least since the establishment of ancient trade routes (Held and McGrew 2007) . They also contend that globalisation is neither inevitable nor on a one-way trajectory towards greater economic, political and cultural integration. Rather, the process has been punctuated by global shocks such as the Great Depression of the 1930s, Word War II and the financial crisis of 2007-8. In some respects -such as the rapid advance of technology and accelerating flows of information -globalisation is marching forward, but there are also indications of opposition to globalisation from the political left and right. In the 1990s, antiglobalization was identified with a youthful movement against corporate ruling elites. In recent years, however, President Trump's pledge to put 'America First', and the British referendum vote to leave the EU and 'take back control' from Brussels, are indications of a nativist and anti-elitist right-wing populism that is hostile to globalisation. At the same time, global trade is slowing, major powers are turning to economic protectionism and seeking to restrict international migration. Yet global problems persist: climate change, rising sea levels, pollution and natural disasters require planetary thinking if they are to be solved. How the tension between globalisation and anti-globalisation plays out will shape the future politics of the police.
TRANSNATIONAL POLICING: AN EMERGING SUBFIELD
Academic interest in transnational policing only began in a concerted way in the UK and USA at the end of the 1980s (Anderson 1989; Nadelmann 1993; Benyon et al. 1993; Bowling and Sheptycki 2015) . This work revealed several important things. First there had been a qualitative shift in policework whereby international police cooperation had become extensive and routine, thus establishing the conditions for a transnational professional community. This was true in Europe (Anderson and den Boer 1994; Anderson et al. 1996; ; Deflem's (2000 Deflem's ( , 2002 Fijnaut 1993; Nogala 2001 , Pincen et al 2014 Sheptycki, 1995; 1998) , the USA (Andreas and Nadelmann 2007) and in other regions Ganapathy and Broadhurst, 2008; Hufnagel 2013 Hufnagel , 2014 ) . There was also the increasing global presence of international police missions, sometimes under the auspices of the United Nations and often with the substantial participation of non-state agencies (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007; Tanner and Dupont 2014) . Research on police at air and seaports and the policing of human mobility revealed another aspect of transnational policing (Slater 2007; Bowling 2004, 2008; Bowling and Westenra 2018a) .
Secondly, these shifts troubled notions of state sovereignty typically held by political scientists, because as police work transcended state boundaries, the locus of control and legality for their work also seemed to shift. Fairly early on it seemed possible to conclude that "a gradual transfer of internal and external security control is taking place from the nation state to international institutions" (Anderson et al 1995: 179) . Observing the European situation, den Boer (2014) saw a 'reluctant dance' between the EU and domestic police agencies around the mutual desire for a collaborative response to transnational crime while being mindful of the imperatives of national sovereignty. The existing literature suggests that this complex dance is a global one (Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012) .
Research on the US police revealed a significant international presence (Nadelmann, 1993) . The dominance of the US law enforcement agenda and policing techniques are evident from the formulations of international agreements that have often been shaped by US officials. Such developments have led to expansion in the scope of criminal law towards US innovations such as asset forfeiture and countermoney laundering, as well as the use of methods such as undercover policing, the use of informers, and electronic surveillance. For Nadelmann, this process amounts to the promotion of US criminal justice norms in the transnational realm. According to him, the effect of this can be expressed in a word: Americanisation. The linked processes of regularisation, accommodation, and homogenisation, has led foreign governments within the US sphere of influence to adapt to an American networked model of international policing. Nadelmann's work in this area demonstrates that overseas policing capacity tends to be enabled when it coincides with the perceived interests of powerful seigneurial states.
The transnational policing literature is now extensive. What might be called the 'globalisation thesis' presents the challenge of how to depict the transnational police so as to include local community constables and international liaison officers, as well as all the other kinds of police agents (Bowling, 2009) . The typology set out in Figure 1 .1 develops Mann's (2007) four-fold 'ideal type' socio-spatial networks of interaction, as one way to delineate the dimensions of transnational policing in different socio-spatial spheres. This typology focuses attention on state-based (public) police institutions, and 'private' policing is a conspicuous absence in the descriptive analysis that follows. We discussed plural and private policing in Chapter 7, but will return briefly to the matter when we consider issues relating to the political and legal accountability of transnational policing.
This table might give the impression of a hierarchy, but it is not. The interconnections across the putative levels of this system must be envisioned as a web. Nonetheless it is useful for the purposes of discussion to order our reading of the above table from bottom to top. The 'paradigm example' of transnational policing concerns drug smuggling (Sheptycki 2002) . Police collect information and intelligence about smuggling routes and methods, the individuals and companies involved in transport, warehousing, trading and distributing prohibited drugs in multiple jurisdictions, and try to co-ordinate operations and investigations (Bowling 2010) . Starting in the late 1960s, police 'drugs squads' were created specifically to make links with other such squads, not least in 'source' and 'transit' countries. This process has been replicated with respect to people smuggling and human trafficking. Just as these illicit activities are local at all points, so too is transnational policing in the domain of drugs and people smuggling. Street dealing and sex work are linked in transnational commodity chains. But somewhere is a local operational, investigative or intelligence police officer, perhaps in the Caribbean (Bowling 2010) , linked through a network of communication, perhaps to police in the port of Antwerp in Belgium (van Sluis et al, 2012) and on further to the police of Paris (Mouhanna and Easton, 2014) , or maybe to Interpol NCBs located 1 The 2018 Novichok poisoning case took a tragic twist on 30 June when Dawn Sturgess sprayed onto her wrists what she thought was perfume from a bottle given to her partner, Charlie Rowley, who had found the bottle. The substance in the bottle turned out to be the same nerve agent. Both Rowley and his partner fell ill and Sturgess died on 8 July. In September 2018, two men, alleged to be active officers in the Russian military intelligence were identified by the British authorities as having travelled to Salisbury to carry out the attack.
around the world (Stacup, 2013) . On a day-to-day basis, drug squad commanders spend their time reviewing intelligence reports provided by local informers, communicating by phone or email with intelligence officers from other countries and preparing to interdict smuggling at ports, airports and border crossings. It also requires extensive collaboration with officers from other agencies such as customs, immigration and airport security.
NATIONAL POLICING HUBS
National-level policing capacity has also developed in many countries alongside the globalization of local policing, but it varies between jurisdictions (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) . Early attempts to document the variety of national police structures in the European Union quickly established that they were moving targets for research (Benyon et al 1993; den Boer 2002) . The structures of national policing in Europe were, to varying extents and at different speeds, converging and gradually becoming more like each other (Liemieux, 2010) . France has three long-established national policing agencies -the Police Nationale, Gendarmerie and Police Judiciare -directly controlled by the ministries of the interior, defence and justice, respectively. Germany has a federal policing structure that devolves most policing to the Lander, while centralizing some high policing functions. Italy and Spain are again different. There has been a general trend in recent years in those countries where countrywide policing capacity did not exist, for the creation of national policing hubs. The Netherlands reorganised its police into an integrated national regional structure in 1993. Sweden created a National Criminal Intelligence Service in 1995, modelled on the British example, and Denmark did the same in 1998. Luxembourg merged its two national police forces into one in January 2000. In Belgium the Gendarmerie, Judicial Police and Municipal Police, were integrated into one police force and rationalized into a federal structure in April 2001. Regional police networks based around major urban cores are overlaid with systems of specialized high policing (Deflem, 2006; Devore et al, 2017; Prins et al, 2012) .
British policing has historically been geographically decentralised and locally accountable. Despite on-going debate about the advantages and disadvantages of a fully national police structure, England and Wales retain 43 separate police constabularies, while Northern Ireland (reformed in 2001) and Scotland (unified in 2013) each have one. There are also in the UK, nonetheless, a number of policing functions that have been centralised for many years, including the British Transport Police, Ministry of Defence police, and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (Johnston, 1992) . More significantly, since the 1990s, there has been the gradual centralisation of the police in the United Kingdom. Building on a network of nine Regional Crime Squads that were formed in the 1960s, the National Crime Squad (1998) and the National Crime Intelligence Service (2001) were created as a means to coordinate a response to serious crimes that crossed constabulary boundaries. Most of these agencies were then amalgamated, together with the investigative and enforcement arms of the UK Customs and Excise and with the infusion of officers from the security and intelligence services (MI5, MI6 and GCHA) to form the Serious Organised Crime Agency in 2005 (Bowling and Ross 2006) . SOCA was subsequently reorganised and re-named the National Crime Agency in 2013. The policing response to terrorism is also centralised but nested within the London Metropolitan Police Service (James, 2013) .
The United States appears to have one of the most decentralized police systems in the world, with an estimated 14,000 police agencies country wide, from small county Sheriff's departments to large federal bureaucracies (Geller and Norris, 1992) . However, the police structure in the United States forms a highly complex and multilayered network of competing and cooperating interests (Willis 2014; Frost, 2014) . From the early years of the 21 st century, local, state and federal police agencies in the United States have been co-ordinated regionally in 'fusion centers' (Peterson 2005; Monaghan, 2010) . The national 'policing web' (Brodeur, 2010) in the United States is far from the perfect bureaucratic 'iron cage' of rationality (Maguire, 2014) .
The impetus for nationalisation comes from various sources. First, there is the belief that local police forces lack the capacity and expertise to deal with organised criminal activity, especially with transnational connections, which has been a catalyst for changing the structure of policing. It is common, for example, for national police forces to have dedicated units to respond to cybercrime, financial crime, online child exploitation, modern slavery, organised immigration crime and so on. Second, centralised national hubs have been created as a means to respond to the rapid growth in demands from overseas police forces requesting information about suspects wanted for crimes committed overseas and requests for extradition. As the international demand has grown, national hubs have been the logical solution to coordinate the responses of large numbers of geographically and organisational decentralised territorial police forces.
The creation of national hubs also intersects with the trend of integrating policing with other law enforcement agencies such as customs, immigration, intelligence and security agencies. National level policing also provides a crucial linkage with the international policing systems through its training, development, selection and posting of officers overseas. Whilst officers might once have anticipated spending their entire career focused on their local patch, with advanced telecommunications, ease of international travel for joint training, conferences and operations, increasingly they are communicating, coordinating and collaborating with counterparts from other countries. The typical career path would be to have some experience in a city or shire constabulary, or in a specialised domestic agency, before being appointed to a post in a national hub. Here, the officers would gain the skills and experience of a 'police diplomat'. There is no standard model for national policing hubs, but in all cases their role is to link domestic police agencies within a nation state, link with police forces in other countries, and provide a link to global and regional agencies.
REGIONAL POLICING AGENCIES
Mirroring the development of regional economic arrangements, trading blocs and political structures in various parts of the world, regional policing organisations such as AFRIPOL, AMERIPOL, ASIANAPOL, EUROPOL and CARIPOL have emerged in recent years. The rationale for the creation of such organisations reflects the previous discussion about domestic policing capacity, or lack of it. The development draws on broader political and economic arguments about the value of regional integration. In most instances, regional policing entities are designed to share information about criminal threats, to develop a strategic response, and bring police officers from different countries together to build strategic, tactical and operational capacity, alongside objectives such as the building of trust and interoperability. Some regional entities also have shared databases, training programmes and conferences, and in some instances, multinational joint investigation teams tasked with collaborative and coordinated operations.
The development of the European Union can be regarded as one of the most advanced examples of an emerging system of supranational governance, in which the Member States' sovereignty is being pooled in certain spheres. The idea of European cooperation specifically in policing matters can be traced back to the nineteenth century congresses that eventually led to the creation of Interpol (see below). There were also numerous forms of bilateral police cooperation, exchange in practices, and the emergence of a professional culture. An interesting example is the French regional 'Brigades du Tigre' of mobile police which were established in 1907. Laurent López (2008) observes that Luxembourgish police officers performed placements of several months in the French units, with the aim of importing their competencies related to their research methods on criminals. Early multilateral cooperation instruments include the European Convention on Extradition signed in 1957 (Morán, 2010) . The Berne Club is another important development involving the directors of various European intelligence and security services meeting on an annual basis since 1968 and was the antecedent of the TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Violence International) group formed in 1975 (Sheptycki 1995 (Sheptycki . 1998 ).
Today, transnational police cooperation is an integral part of the European enlargement agenda. According to the EU Commission, the objective is to create a 'common security and justice area', strengthening regional cross-border cooperation between law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in the fight against organised crime and corruption in Europe. This is to be achieved by 'networking, mutual legal assistance, transfer of proceedings, requests for extradition, joint investigation teams, witness protection programmes' (European Commission 2016). Fijnaut contrasts multilateral and EU communitarian police cooperation, indicating the absence or presence of supranational elements to be found in the policing agencies (1991: 22) . The distinction lies in decision-making procedures that derive from the composition of the governing bodies (Fijnaut, 1991: 22) . While the European Commission and the European Parliament play an important role in the 'community method,' national governments have a greater say in multilateral agreements. The Schengen agreement and its implementation convention is an example for both categories at different points in time. At its birth in 1990, the agreement between France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands was of a multilateral nature, and then became part of the EU's legal framework with its authority extended to the other signatory states when it was integrated into the 1998 Amsterdam Treaty (Fijnaut, 1991: 22; San Pedro, 2006: 203) .
Monica den Boer sketches the evolution of the European treaties that embedded existing police cooperation structures in the EU framework (den Boer 2014 Boer , 2015 . The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was the 'first formal basis for police cooperation in the EU,' but was widely criticized for its 'intricate hierarchical working structure, the lack of meaningful competences for EU institutions, the significant margin of discretion for the member states, and the lowest common denominator decision-making process of the unanimity rule' (den Boer, 2014: 12) . Nonetheless, Maastricht brought coherence to pan-European action and led to the creation of the European Drugs Unit in Strasbourg in 1993, that would eventually transmogrify into EUROPOL (den Boer, 2014: 12) . The influential 1997 Amsterdam Treaty led to a 'normative jump' in willingness among police officers, or at least police diplomats working in the interstices of the European Union, to unify criteria and actions across Europe (Morán, 2010: 269) . It also gave more powers to Europol through the legislative instruments that guaranteed flexibility for member states alongside a more binding path to implementation (den Boer, 2014: 12) . The 1999 Tampere decision of the European Council was also influential, concluding that mutual recognition would be the cornerstone of police and judicial cooperation. This signalled the political will that brought about the European Arrest Warrant and Investigation Order.
The development of the Schengen Information System (SIS) is key to understanding European police cooperation. Through the Amsterdam Treaty, the Schengen acquis was integrated into the institutional and judicial structure of the EU bringing crucial policing matters under European Community competence for the first time (den Boer, 2014: 12) . Within this framework, SIS aims to improve the cooperation of justice, police and customs officials. Formally, the central organ, located in Strasbourg, receives information generated by each Schengen country and then, after verification, distributes it to a national hub in every Schengen member state. The national hub is, in turn, connected to each policing and law enforcement agency in the system (San Pedro, 2006: 206) . The Amsterdam Treaty also saw the establishment of SIRENE offices in each country which are responsible for supplementary information exchange and coordination of activities connected to SIS alerts (Guille, 2010: 60) . In practice, this is a real time system in which there is no central verification and validation is done by SIRENE officers in each state. Cooperation between states, linked to a specific SIS alert, may be one-to-one or one-to-many and involves co-ordination of cross border policing. To enable prompt, confidential and efficient follow-up of cases, communication is made through the exchange of standardized forms -providing additional information, validating alerts via a secure network.
The 2007 Lisbon Treaty made the most important change in European police cooperation (den Boer, 2014: 13) . This Treaty enabled the EU to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the case of serious crime with a cross-border dimension. In relation to criminal procedural law, the EU, after Lisbon (Article 82(2) TFEU), established minimum rules concerning mutual admissibility of evidence between member states, the rights of individuals in criminal procedure, and the rights of the victims of crime (Hufnagel, 2013: 38) . It led to the creation of new intergovernmental bodies engaged in coordinating procedures, and a new Council standing committee on internal security (COSI), to 'facilitate, promote and strengthen coordination of operational actions between EU member states in the field of internal security… [concerning] police and customs cooperation, external border protection and judicial cooperation in criminal matters… ' (European Commission, 2009: 3) It introduced the possibility of a European Public Prosecutor's Office (Banks, 2016) . After Lisbon, EU institutions were provided with more powers in the area of police and justice cooperation in criminal matters, particularly the European Parliament and Court of Justice (den Boer, 2014: 13) , and established more effective mechanisms for cross-border policing (Hufnagel, 2013: 39) .
EUROPOL is the most advanced and ambitious attempt at pan-continental police cooperation. Following ratification of the 1995 Europol Convention, the agency became operational in July 1999. It was fully integrated into the European Union following a Council Decision in 2009. Europol is responsible for collecting and disseminating criminal intelligence, as well as law enforcement cooperation with the goal of responding to transnational organised crime and terrorism. It has specialist units including the European Serious and Organised Crime Centre, European Cybercrime Centre (established 2013), and a European Counter Terrorism Centre (in 2016). Sometimes characterised as the European FBI, the agency has no enforcement powers, but exists to enable cooperation among police agencies within the EU. The Tampere Programme of 2000 (den Boer 2014: 12) reinforced the powers of Europol, founded Eurojust, and opened the way for the creation of Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) and the European Police Academy (CEPOL) (ibid.: 13). Initiatives to simplify the mechanisms of enhanced cooperation came with the Nice Treaty in 2000. The powers of the Schengen agreement were extended in the internal security realm. This allowed, amongst other things, for the establishment of national biometric databases, holding DNA, fingerprints, and vehicle registration numbers to which other Member states can have access (den Boer, 2010: 56) .
Whereas some argue that the increased involvement of the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice's enlarged powers, make EU policymaking and police cooperation more accountable and transparent (Mayoral, 2011) , others deem the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty less favourable. They describe the OLP (ordinary legislative procedure) as "'trialogue' …between the European Commission, Parliament and Council […], a series of informal working meetings [which] are a major transparency black hole where large concessions are won and lost with very little oversight and without public disclosure' (Dolan, 2015) . Essentially, the European Parliament serves only to rubber stamp the deals secured by a handful of negotiators from each institution, side-lining 99% of MEPs in the process. There is still an extensive field of activity where European countries are not ready to synchronise their regulations on police cooperation, and wide variation in transnational policing practices across the continent. In short, we lack a supranational institutional framework to enable practice to be documented, examined, and held to account. Moreover, understanding transnational police cooperation requires a closer look at informal bilateral and multilateral practices (Hufnagel, 2013: 236) .
The preference for informal cooperation is one of the key findings from numerous case studies of transnational policing (Bigo 1998 , Alain, 2000 Bowling 2010 ). Marc Alain's (2000: 247) analysis of cooperation practices in France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, for example, demonstrates that formal channels and mechanisms of information exchange and communication have only partly achieved their intended goal, and are perceived as less efficient than informal practices by police officers. Herschinger and Jachtenfuchs (2012) challenge the antinomy between formal institutionalisation and informality, arguing that they are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, Anderson et al. (1995) , Bigo (2000) and Monica den Boer (2010) , show that both coexist and develop simultaneously, and the interplay of informality and institutionalisation is not 'either-or' (Herschinger and Jachtenfuchs, 2012: 505) . Indeed, informal cooperation can function as an important prerequisite for formal institutionalisation, and does not necessarily disappear once institutions have been created (ibid.). This is confirmed by Hufnagel's (2013: 243) . analysis of cases of informal regional cooperation run by practitioners, that impacted significantly on the harmonised institutionalised legal framework of the EU.
GLOBAL POLICING AGENCIES
Interpol declares itself to be 'the world's largest international police organization, the world's only global police organization, and the world's most effective international police body' (Cheah 2010). It is without doubt the leading global policing brand (Sheptycki 2017a) , and the second largest public international organisation in the world. The seeds of the Interpol idea can be found in the latter part of the nineteenth century. These germinated at the first International Criminal Police Congress in Monaco in 1914 and came to fruition in the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) in 1929, based on an agreement among 22 European and US police chiefs and headquartered in Vienna. The Commission met annually in Vienna until 1938, on the eve of World War II, when the Nazis assumed control. In 1942 the ICPC fell completely under German control and relocated to Berlin (Anderson 1989: 41-2; Deflem 2002: 174-89) . The post-war rebuilding was led by Belgium, and in 1946 the IPCC moved to a new headquarters in Paris. The name Interpol was formally adopted in 1956 as part of its modernized constitution, and the organisation became autonomous by establishing a financial model based on collecting dues from member countries and relying on investments. The new constitution also established the political neutrality of Interpol by focusing its activity on 'ordinary law crime' in different countries in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Intervention or activities of a 'political, military, religious or racial character' was forbidden (Sheptycki 2017b ).
The structure of Interpol has remained stable despite a remarkable expansion in the size and function of the organisation (Chea 2010) . It currently has 192 membercountries, each of which maintains a National Central Bureau (NCB) staffed by officers drawn from domestic police forces. The reference to member countries (rather than states) highlights the Interpol constitution (Sheptycki 2017) . Its members constitute 'any official police body whose functions come within the framework of activities of the organisation'. The organisation is, therefore, unlike a true Intergovernmental Organisation (IO). The United Nations, for example, is founded on an international convention between national governments. Interpol started out life as a nongovernmental organisation in 1948. It has gradually achieved a special status as an IO although, in its actual functioning, it is a transnational network (Sheptycki 2017: 74) . This status is, in part, facilitated by the fact that its structure mirrors that of a typical IO (Sheptycki 2007b) . That is: it has a permanent headquarters in the French city of Lyon; a decision-making body (the General Assembly); an administrative body (the General Secretariat); an Executive Committee for day-to-day running of the organisation; and field offices in the form of the NCBs nested within each member police force (Sheptycki 2017b) . The NCBs are bound by domestic laws, but act as an extension of Interpol through their activities in collecting information and communicating this to and from the central organs, tending to identify with the mission of the organisation as they do so (Bowling 2010: 105-111; Sheptycki 2017b ).
The autonomy of Interpol from the system of states and from the police organisations that make up its membership is crucial to its history and contemporary functioning. The attempts in the late 19 th and early 20 th century to create a permanent International Police Agency foundered because of the reluctance on the part of national governments to do anything that would weaken or relinquish state sovereignty (Deflem 2002: 107) . The key to the success of Interpol functioning is the ability of the police to gain independence from political centres, to present the problem of crime as an apolitical, technical matter that should be left to security experts, especially as it became transnational in nature, therefore requiring transnational communication, cooperation and collaboration.
The work of Interpol is organised around four core functions: (i) secure global communications; (ii) operational database and data-services; (iii) operational police support; (iv) training and development. The first two of these functions are concerned with collecting, storing and sharing information. The infrastructure which is available at all times to its membership is its communications network -known as I-24/7 -that connects all of the members with each other, and with headquarters and its centrally located databases. Many countries extend access I-24/7 to other national law enforcement entities at strategic locations, such as border crossings, airports, and customs and immigration authorities. This gives frontline officers direct access to Interpol records of suspect names, lost and stolen travel documents, and stolen motor vehicles. The lost and stolen travel documents database is growing rapidly form 55 million to 71 million between 2015 and 2016. In 2016, member countries undertook 1.7 billion searches to detect when an individual attempts to travel with fraudulent or stolen documents (Interpol Annual report 2016).
Interpol circulates information among member countries through a system of notices, of which the Red Notice is the most significant. This advises the police receiving the notice that a person is wanted, and requests assistance in 'apprehending the wanted person on behalf of the requesting country' (Martha 2010 , cited by Sheptycki 2017a . Before a Red Notice can be issued, requesting NCBs must ensure that the person sought is subject to criminal proceedings or has been convicted of a crime (with evidence of a domestic court order or arrest warrant), that extradition will be sought in the event that person is arrested overseas, and that sufficient evidence has been provided. In 2016, nearly 13,000 Red Notices were circulated, a seventeen-fold increase from the 737 notices circulated in 1998 (Sheptycki 2017: 78-9) . The Red Notice cannot be construed as an international arrest warrant because receiving countries must work within their own legal framework and have discretion in how they decide to respond to the request. It does, nonetheless, provide prima facia evidence of wrongdoing that enables domestic police (or immigration) officers to use the power of arrest on behalf of a foreign government. In this respect Interpol harnesses national law and legal institutions to the global policing mission (Sheptycki 2017: 70) . It is true that 'the man from Interpol never arrested anyone' because the organisation has no formal law enforcement powers (Sheptycki 2004 ), but he (or she) has no more need to personally carry out an arrest than would a domestic Chief Constable.
In a world linked by instantaneous telecommunications, the coercive and intrusive powers of the police are able to travel through international boundaries largely unaffected by them and take effect at long distances from where the power was initially authorised (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) . The legality and rectitude of this process assumes that Red Notices are always based on accurate and reliable information, are transparent, fair, subject to proper oversight and are free of corruption. Unfortunately, there is evidence that this is not always the case (Sheptycki 2017: 81-82) .
Beyond data processing and communications, Interpol has gradually expanded its operational and support services through its Command and Coordination Centre (CCC), which is the first point of contact for member countries requesting assistance with major incidents. In a crisis or emergency -such as an earthquake or terrorist attack -officers located in the CCC provide analytical and investigative support, including the deployment of specialised teams on the ground. In relation to mega-events, such as sporting events or international summits, the CCC can deploy officers to assist with security arrangements. Interpol also conducts research and development and has an extensive training capacity to develop skills for officers at headquarters, NCBs and member police forces.
Interpol is a highly ambitious organisation that has grown dramatically in geographical reach, resources and power over the past two decades. It is well established as a worldwide hub for transnational police cooperation and in aims to lead global policing activities. Although the impact of Interpol in the day-to-day work of the British police is unlikely to be visible to any but the most acute observer, the Interpol NCB based in Manchester is an integral part of the contemporary policing scene. It acts as the UK link to international investigations and is home to the casework coordination and fugitives' units.
A key question raised by the rapid development of Interpol is what can authorise a policing capacity that transcends national frontiers and moves beyond the boundaries of traditional defined legal sovereignty? (Sheptycki 2017: 68-9) . Since legitimate authority depends on a democratic process to ensure that the use of coercive and intrusive powers are deployed in the public interest, how far is Interpol structured to give life to that principle? The short answer is not very far (Sheptycki 2004 (Sheptycki , 2007b . Although Interpol presents itself as an IO, all decisions within Interpol are made by 'high level' police officials and there is no external oversight (Sheptycki 2017b: 74) . Although the NCBs are subject to domestic laws of the countries where they are based, they act effectively as an extension of the global reach of Interpol powers. Despite Interpol's dominant position in public discussion of cross-border policing, there are numerous other agencies with a global policing function located within such organisations as the United Nations, International Criminal Court (Investigations Division), the World Customs Organisation (Customs Enforcement Network) and the Financial Action Task Force, the inter-governmental organisation concerned with money laundering, terrorist financing and the integrity of the international financial system (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) . The most important of these is United Nations Police coordinates ordinary law policing responses to work alongside military personnel in conflict, post conflict and other crisis situations (Hills 2009; Greener 2009 Greener , 2012 The scale and scope of UN policing has grown dramatically in the past decade with around 13,000 police from 90 countries deployed in 18 UN peace missions. The role of the 'formed police unit' is to provide on the ground support, or stand in for domestic police who can sometimes be entirely non-existent. The mandate is to build, support or 'act as substitute of partial substitute' for police forces in the ordinary policing functions of preventing and detecting crime, protecting life and property, and maintaining public order. The idea of an International Police Force (IPF) has been advocated since the interwar years (Davis 1930) , and became a staple of discussions of global justice after World War II (Johansen and Mendlovitz 1980) . The UN Police Division, as it exists today, with ambitious development plans and coordination with Interpol to 'develop a global policing doctrine', comes very close to the vision first sketched out a century ago.
OVERSEAS LIAISON OFFICERS
Overseas liaison officers are crucial actors in the development and practice of transnational policing. For some decades, first in the USA and then on other continents, police officers have been specially selected from local or national police agencies and dispatched overseas. This may be for a short visit to one or more countries, or for a period of years working as an accredited 'police diplomat' in an embassy or high commission. In origins, the liaison officer represents an extension of domestic policing into the transnational realm; but in terms of contemporary practice, this person is a globally-mobile police officer. Having emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century, this specialism seems set to play a very significant role in the future of global policing. Didier Bigo's pioneering empirical and theoretical research on liaison officers shows they play a key role in managing the flow of information between various police, gendarme, customs and immigration officers (Bigo 2000 (Bigo , 2014 . Working in the spaces within and between police organisations, Bigo likens liaison officers to 'stationmasters' directing and shunting information to where it is needed as quickly as possible. They are located in at least four positions: posted to other countries within a region (including specialist areas such as counter-terrorism); posted to countries outside the region; seconded to regional entities (such as Europol); or seconded to global agencies such as UNPOL or Interpol.
Sheptycki's analysis of police operational intelligence files, and observation of liaison officers' co-ordinating role in the work of police units, provides a grounded view of co-operation between France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Great Britain in the English Channel Region (Sheptycki, 1998; 2001; 2002) . The study of liaison officers in this region was undertaken under the auspices of a formal (although not Treaty-based) regional co-operation framework called the Cross Channel Intelligence Conference (CCIC). Sheptycki's work documents the beginning of the CCIC in 1968 and traces its development as a regional operational intelligence hub up to the end of the 1990s. It shows how advances in police communications technologies, from the telex machine to the mobile phone, facilitated the development of a transnational police network in the region. This research documents examples of long-term covert police drug investigations, and examples of the police service role. In the latter category are cases concerning animal and child welfare, and the repatriation of a dead body to the UK after it was found floating in international waters. (Kleiven, 2011; Courtin et al., 2000: 188) . Initially focused on drug trafficking in production and transit countries, the network was extended to become generalist crime liaison officers concerned with child pornography, environmental crime and human trafficking in the late 1990s (Kleiven, 2011: 66-65) . Conceiving of states as disaggregated institutions, with their various parts only loosely integrated, helps us to understand the autonomy of, big city police forces -such as the NYPD or the London Metropolitan Police -who also post liaison officers abroad.
The liaison officers' role includes acting as first point of contact for visiting police officers, protecting the interests of nationals travelling overseas, exchanging information, investigating transnational criminal collaborations, identifying and repatriating fugitives. Block describes their function as official representatives of their agencies as well as that of a fixer, facilitating requests to and from their home country for 'information, evidence, interrogations, searches, arrests and extraditions' (Block, 2007: 374) . They work across a web of local, national and supranational security institutions, aiding judicial cooperation by preparing and supporting the execution of letters of request for evidence (commissions rogatoire), and assisting with extradition and rendition. They play a role in migration and visa matters, advice and capacity building, training and mentoring. An important element of the role is establishing trust among police officers from other jurisdictions. This requires the skilful use of formal and informal communication and collaboration to overcome procedural or bureaucratic problems. Although there may not be a 'grand rationale' for it (den Boer and Block 2014: 190) , the liaison officer -especially when engaged in 'high policing' -is being established as a privileged role in the transnational system.
Competition is an important dynamic in the work of liaison officers (Courtin et al., 2000: 188) . In the context of Eastern Europe, there is wide variation in the number of ILO detached to different countries. Compared to the German, French and Scandinavian officers, the Dutch have fewer liaison officers dispatched to Eastern European countries (Courtin et al., 2000: 188) . In Sofia, the UK has only one customs officer who works with the local police and in Romania through policy advisors to the Ministry of the Interior (Courtin et al., 2000: 188) . Galy observes that competition between liaison officers is always visible. Tthe actors are respectful of national interests, and know how to work together coherently in light of common European interests bearing in mind the strength of the US presence, with FBI offices in Warsaw and in Budapest and Sofia (Galy in Courtin et al., 2000: 188) . European officers are aware of distinct national interests or differences in general, but that they can be overcome with regards to a greater common interest in the EU. This could point to a common culture and aim in European policing, which (in this case) competes with US police. Here again a balance of power is at play, and there is a visible struggle for greater cooperation to gain influence in policing.
Ludo Block, a former liaison officer, documents the daily practice of operational police co-operation between Europe and Russia (Block, 2007: 367) . Block suggests that Europol plays a less significant role in European relations with Third countries than Interpol, which has not become redundant with the establishment of the former. Their co-ordinating and formalizing efforts testify to ambitious political goals. European policies have insufficient understanding of police reality (Block, 2007: 382) . They have neither set up operational police collaboration nor have they designated a point of contact for Europol (Block, 2007: 373) . The main vehicle for interaction between the EU member states and Russia, is still through bilateral relations through liaison officers, whose number is growing (Block, 2007: 373-4) . The growth can partly be attributed to the general increase in liaison officers throughout Europe with as many as seven liaison officers being sent to one state (Block, 2007: 374) .
Block provides a glimpse of the bilateral and multilateral agreements which supplement the liaison officer system, such as the Finnish-Russian Border guard working group, the German-Russian working group on organized crime, and the multilateral Baltic Sea Task Force on organized crime. Golunov provides further examples referring to the Polish-Russian working group on coordination in the fight against trans-border crime and the Estonian-Russian collaboration (Golunov, 2012: 130) . There are numerous obstacles that shape the liaison officer's work including language barriers, bureaucratic hurdles, disparities in legal culture (e.g. prioritization of cases, differences in legal systems), competition among domestic agencies who are often under-resourced, dealing with corrupt officers and the political dependency of law enforcement agencies (Block, 2012: 378-379) .
There is now a solid body of work that has documented the roles and practices of liaison officers, sitting at the margins of domestic policing but increasingly central to transnational policing. There are clear affinities and rivalries among liaison officers, and numerous tensions as the motives of control, common to the occupational culture of police everywhere, collide with national and organisational identities (Bigo 2014) . Although liaison officers come from a wide range of different national and organisational backgrounds they share many similarities. They tend to be well educated, multilingual, urbane and cosmopolitan, and recognise each other as inhabitants of the small world of transnational policing. For some, the role offers the prospect of promotion while others find it frustrating. In common with domestic police, liaison officers value street experience, but are themselves 'knowledge workers' with skills in investigation and strategic analysis. There is a wide range of subcultural styles -including the technician, diplomat, entrepreneur, PR expert, legal ace, spy, field operator and enforcer -which can be adapted to achieve shared goals in the transnational space between (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) .
The evidence suggests that horizontal trust-based relationships created among liaison officers enable transnational cooperation, in spite of differences based on legal differences, nationality, gender and ethnicity. This is because they achieve a depoliticised perspective in which the common enemy is the criminal. Their work transcends allegiance to a specific police organisation or nation state in order to build sufficient trust and commitment to effective cooperation. When national governments loosen direct control, Aydini and Yon argue, sub-state actors discover their potential to work efficiently by allowing a horizontal expansion of governance into the transnational space. This has been described elsewhere as the emerging transnational state system (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) These 'transnational liasionships' are signs of a new form of public governance but leave open the question of how transnational governance can be held to account by the global commonwealth (Sheptycki 2002b) .
CHALLENGES TO THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF THE POLICE
The questions of accountability and national sovereignty (Bowling and Sheptycki, 2016) can be answered theoretically by the contention that it is only permissible for police officers to use coercive and intrusive powers within their own geographical jurisdiction. The very definition of police power -the possession of specialist powers to use legitimate coercive force within a given territory -implies jurisdictional exclusivity. And yet, it has been clear for decades that the domestic police forces have never really had a monopoly of policing power (see chapter 1 and 7). Monica den Boer argues that there is an 'implementation gap': member states 'have not embedded European police cooperation in their domestic systems… [and] remain caught between national sovereignty and solidarity' (den Boer, 2014: 10) . This makes the everyday reality of police cooperation a 'policy field far removed from supranational politics' (den Boer, 2014:11) . Deflem agrees, highlighting the 'remarkable persistence of nationality…in international police work' despite increasing transnational policing practices and 'formation of multilateral cooperation initiatives ' (2006a: 339) . Malcolm Anderson, writing about the emergence of transnational policing in the mid-1990s, is critical of a central state model based on a strict adherence to the principle of national sovereignty in its purest form. The absolutist conception of state sovereignty, he argues, is anachronistic in the policing field because the speed of communication makes it impossible for states to maintain a monopoly of information.
Where policing resources are fragmented, national authorities cannot dominate all external relations, and small and poor states in particular have difficulties exercising sovereignty. The polar alternative to the absolutist conception of sovereignty is the 'decentralised state' model. Here, officers in different countries communicate directly with one another, and informal contacts across frontiers become standard practice. This, Anderson predicted, would result in a free market in information, a reduction of nation state authority, and autonomy for the police working in the international domain. In Anderson's view, writing in 1989, this ' represents an erosion of sovereignty and control, unacceptable to virtually all the advanced industrialized democracies'. The decentralised model would have the virtue of ending clandestine or informal contacts, recognising that technology facilitates direct communication that it is difficult to control using an authoritative set of rules.
Anderson posed two intermediate models: (1) qualified centralization where national offices are normally in control but in exceptional circumstances (e.g. urgency) horizontal cooperation through ad hoc bilateral agreements is permitted. (2) Qualified decentralization allows direct communication but requires reporting of this to national offices. Anderson foresaw a point at which police forces would become accustomed to direct communication with their counterparts, effective intervention by the national offices could become more and more difficult, thus eroding state sovereignty. This is in fact what has come to pass: officers are in constant contact with their counterparts and colleagues overseas, and in many cases, there is no requirement to report this to senior command. It is merely assumed that horizontal communication will stay at that officer-to-officer level to avoid compromising operations.
What of the use of coercive force beyond national boundaries? Research has documented instances where overseas police officers have carried out (or have attempted to carry out) arrests outside their jurisdiction without involving local police (Bowling 2010) . The most blatant examples concern the high policing activities involved in the 'extraordinary rendition' of people suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. In these cases, domestic police and intelligence agencies have arrested people on 'watch lists', carried out interrogations and removed them to so called 'black sites' abroad. One of the most egregious was the case of Khalid El Masri, a German citizen who was abduycted by the Macedonian police in 2003, handed over to the US Central Intelligence Agency and taken to the US 'Salt Pit'. There he was held for four months until the US government admitted that this was a case of mistaken identity and released and released him at night on a desolate road in Albania. In 2012, the European Court of Human Rights determined that El Masri had been detained unlawfully, tortured and abused, and criticised the Macedonian police for collaborating with US secret programmes. In the US courts, the Government claimed 'state secrets privilige' and the case was dismissed.
Police liaison officers do not have formal arrest powers, but they are able to achieve coercive outcomes through action that could be described as remote control or 'governing at a distance'. Through lawful routes, they can use available information and other resources to enable local police officers to undertake arrests on their behalf. Overseas liaison officers are experienced senior officers within their own organisations, who are perceived as senior relative to their counterparts in weaker states. Much of the formal relationship between the liaison officer and the local security authorities is at the Commissioner level, and their operational work is working with an Assistant Commissioner or Senior Superintendent. With liaison officers from powerful states based in various countries, the closeness of the working relationship permits more direct collaboration. There seems to be a tension between the expectations of police officers working as representatives of sovereign nations, on the one hand, and police cultural autonomy and officer discretion on the other. Referring to developments in the dynamic European context, changes in national sovereignty, new actors in law enforcement and policing, as well as an increase in jurisdictional and investigation instruments, Bruggeman (2002: 259) calls for a new system of accountability. While until now, the system of accountability has mainly been structured according to national borders, the fact that 'policing is no longer a set of practices embedded in the sovereign nation-state' (Sheptycki, 2002: 323) , necessitates an accountability structure which should apply to all forms of policing, including those carried out by intergovernmental and supranational law enforcement agencies (Bruggeman 2002: 259; Bowling 2010: 312-15; Bowling and Sheptycki 2012: 136) .
CONCLUSION
Globalisation is reshaping the politics of the police. Although there have been international connections among police organisations since they emerged as an integral part of the machinery of government in the nineteenth century (see chapter 3), a quantitative and qualitative shift is now underway. From the end of the twentieth century, the task of policing that had been seen for two hundred years as a domestic matter was transformed into a political and policy issue that was widely perceived as integral to global governance (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012) . Henceforth, domestic police chiefs cannot afford to police their neighbourhoods without being 'indigenousyet-globally-aware' (Cain, 2000: 251) .
This chapter has charted how the transnational turn is shaping policing in local, national, regional and global spheres of activity. Global policing agencies emerged and gathered strength during the second half of the twentieth century. Although Interpol has nineteenth century roots and was formally established in 1923, it was decimated during the World War II, and was built from the ground up in the post-war period to become today's leading global policing brand. The idea of an international police force also has old roots but only became a reality under the aegis of the United Nations in the 1960s; it too has grown into a powerful global policing entity. Every region of the world now has some form of pan-continental policing organisation that provides coordination, cooperation and collaboration across numerous policing agencies. Shared databases and common policing doctrine provide interoperability and joint investigation and enforcement activities across entire continental regions.
Debates about the case for and against national police forces have petered out in recent years, replaced with a diversity of pragmatic solutions to the increased demand for intelligence exchange and operational collaboration at the national level. In some instances -for example, Scotland and the Netherlands -the solution has been the creation of a national police force. While neither the UK or the USA have a national police force, both have well-funded organisations that constitute the central authority for extradition requests, information repository and expertise in such fields as transnational organised crime, cybercrime, money laundering and counter-terrorism. National-level policing hubs provide a crucial linkage between thousands of local police forces and police entities operating in the global sphere.
The national policing architecture includes many other members of the wider policing family: most obviously siblings in immigration policing, border control, maritime and customs; but also cousins in governmental agencies with powers of surveillance and coercion operating in financial regulation, tax and excise collection, health and safety, environmental protection. Taken together, contemporary policing constitutes a complex 'patchwork quilt' of agencies that is stitched together by the efforts of transnational liaison officers (Sheptycki 1995: 613) Like politics, however, policework is mostly a local matter. Despite the growth of global, regional and national police agencies, the overwhelming majority of direct interaction between police and public is with uniformed officers in town and city streets and traffic police on the highways, and less frequently with plain-clothes detectives and other specialists. Behind this interaction, however, is a far-reaching change in the nature of policework. Today's street police, through the introduction of new information and communication technologies, are now able to check suspect identities using mobile finger print readers, facial recognition software, automatic vehicle number plates readers and biometric means that link with domestic and international database. Local policing has been transnationalised and global policing now reaches deep into local communities.
These developments raise profound new questions about the relationship between state and citizen. Observers are critical of the democratic 'accountability deficit' at national and European levels (den Boer, 2002; Feys et al, 2018; Fijnaut, 2002) with serious implications for local accountability (McLaughlin, 1992 ) to whch we return in Chapter 10. Local policing was proposed as the solution to the problems of burglary, theft, interpersonal violence and social disorder in local communities; but what is the role of the domestic police officer when threats to life and property emanate from transnational organised crime groups and rogue states? Some parts of the world are made deeply insecure by political violence and international mafias. In many other locations, globalisation has had the effect of increasing inequality, unemployment and precariousness, undermining community safety.
In such circumstances, what kind of response can we expect from the local police, and from the newly created specialised agencies set up with the goal of keeping us safe? Moreover, are we content that the suitable foes of terrorists and transnational organized criminals are the main thing? Could global policing prioritise more pressing threats such as environmental destruction, global warming, or corporate crime? Perhaps worldwide policing could be better orientated towards a service role? Whatever its aims and objectives, how do we know whether or not international policing agencies are effective, efficient and fair? On what criteria can we judge whether or not the billions that are spent on global policing is money well spent?
Transnational policing growth growing in size, resources and ambition. It is enabled by advances in technology, and by new laws and policies that are creating domestic and local linkages. It is growing more powerful and is now seen as indispensable to domestic and international security and order maintenance. Increasingly, local policework is shaped by global forces, linked via national policing hubs, into transnational databases and expertise. What are the implications of these changes for the fundamental question of liberty, security and accountability? As we have argued elsewhere in this book, the paradoxes of policing require a searching analysis of how power can be held to account, and through which democratic processes the police should be governed. This was never an easy question, even while policing was authorised and delivered in local communities by parish constables. Now that local policework is shaped, at least to some extent, by global forces, by what means can we be confident that the state's coercive and intrusive powers are deployed for the social good?
